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Scientific Information Research

Keywords

chip; American think tank; think tank report; China-US technology competition

Abstract

[Purpose/significance]This paper focuses on the viewpoints of leading American think tanks on chip competition with China, aiming to unravel the logic behind the formulation of U.S. chip policies towards China. It also seeks to explore innovative pathways for the development of China's chip industry and provide strategic recommendations beneficial to Sino-American chip competition. [Method/process]The study selects 20 representative research reports from 9 prominent think tanks and employs a literature analysis approach to dissect the viewpoints, motives, and potential influences found in these reports. [Result/conclusion]The results reveal that most American think tanks adopt a firm stance, perceiving the rise of China's chip industry as a threat. Calls for sanctions against Chinese chips dominate the mainstream discourse. In response, China should strengthen its own innovation strategy and actively address the situation through avenues such as deepening Sino-American dialogues for understanding and seeking international multilateral cooperation.

First Page

98

Last Page

110

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.19809/j.cnki.kjqbyj.2024.03.008

Reference

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